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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FAIR USE DEFENSE IN
LEBO=VTZ V. PARAMOUNTPICTURES CORPORATION
t

MATTHEWA. EISENSTEIN
"Fair use should be perceived not as a disorderly
basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a
departure from the principles governing that body of
law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright,
whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives
of that law."1
"Intellectual property
is a natural field for eco2
law."
of
analysis
nomic
INTRODUCTION
In Leibovitz v. ParamountPicturesCorp., the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit determined whether the use of a copyrighted photograph of pregnant actress Demi Moore constituted "fair use."3 The
plaintiff, Annie Leibovitz, is a well-known photographer whose works
often depict celebrities in uncommon poses. One of her most recognized works appeared on the cover of the August 1991 issue of the
monthly magazine, Vanity Fair. The work depicted the nude, preg-

1-B.S. 1997, Northwestern University J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank the editors of the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review, especially
Andrew Morton, Alison Pauly, Felicity Rowe, and Phyllis Staub, for their hard work and
assistance. Thanks also to Professors Gorman and Huang for their suggestions on an
earlier draft. Special thanks to my parents for their guidance and encouragement, and
to Stacey for her constant love and support. Errors are mine alone.
IPierre N. Leval, Toward aFair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
2 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Copyright Law,
18
J. LEG.AL STUD. 325, 325 (1989).
See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (as-

serting that both sides disagree only as to the availability of the affirmative defense of
fair use since there is no dispute over plaintiff's prima facie case of infringement).
"The fair use doctrine 'permits other people to use copyrighted material without the
owner's consent in a reasonable manner for certain purposes.'" Id. (quoting Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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nant body of actress Demi Moore, in profile, with her right arm covering her breasts, and her left hand supporting her stomach. The issue
became one of the "best selling issues" of Vanity Fair.'
Early in 1994, the defendant, Paramount Pictures, ran an advertising campaign for its upcoming comedy motion picture, Naked Gun 33
1/3: The FinalInsult. As part of the campaign, Paramount produced a
poster displaying the face of the movie's star, Leslie Nielson, on the
nude body of a pregnant woman, with the slogan "DUE THIS
MARCH." Paramount did not mechanically copy Leibovitz's picture
but rather commissioned a photographer to pose a pregnant, nude
body, designed to emulate the photograph of Moore.7 "Great effort
was made to ensure that the photograph resembled in meticulous detail the one taken by Leibovitz." Leibovitz "protested the use" and
subsequently brought an action for copyright infringement. 9
The District Court for the Southern District of New York entered

summary judgment for the alleged infringer, Paramount. ' ° Applying
both the statutory four-pronged fair use analysis," and the Supreme
Court's recent analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.," the district3
court held that use of Leibovitz's photograph by Paramount was fair.'
Leibovitz appealed, contending that even if the advertisement was ap4 See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 111 (detailing the image).

5 Id.
6 Id.
7

See id. (describing the process by which the photograph's concept was developed

and executed).
8

Id.

9

Id. at 112.

10 See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.

1996).
11The relevant part of the statute states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-(l) the purpose and character
of the use ... ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
12 510 U.S. 569, 578-94 (1994).
is See Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226. The district court found that "[t]hree of the
four fair use factors in the present case militate in favor of a finding of fair use, largely
because the defendant's transformation of the plaintiff's photograph has resulted in
public access to two distinct works .... " Id. Furthermore, Leibovitz stated in her
deposition that she thought the Nielsen picture was a parody of her own, and the court
subsequently found that the Nielsen photograph was parody rather than satire. See id.
at 1222-23.

2000]

ANECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFFAIR USE

propriately considered a parody of her photograph, Paramount used
the work for "commercial purposes" and utilized more than necessary
for the parody.14 Leibovitz thus claimed "that the District Court erred
in granting Paramount's motion for summaryjudgment."15 The Second Circuit affirmed, however, holding that Paramount Picture's advertisement of the forthcoming movie was a fair use of the plaintiff's
work. 16 Like the district court, the appellate court based its reasoning
on the four statutory factors defining fair use and the Supreme
Court's analysis in Campbell, in
which the Court addressed the fair use
7
defense for works of parody.1
This Comment will demonstrate that lower courts have struggled
with the fair use defense, especially for works of parody, and continue
to struggle even after the Supreme Court's decision in CampbelL An
economic approach will provide a useful fiamework for analyzing this
doctrine. Part I provides an overview of the fair use defense, focusing
on parody as a fair use and revealing the difficulties that lower courts
have encountered in dealing with the issue. I then discuss the Campbell decision and the uncertainty authors and parodists may continue
to face. In addition, Part I explains the benefits of an economic approach to a fair use analysis. Part II describes basic economic princiLeibovitz, 137 F.3d at 112.
is Id.
16 See id. at 110 (stating that although the advertisement had a commercial use, it
14

qualified as a parody and was entitled to the fair use defense).
17 See Campbeg 510 U.S. at 575-91 (stating that under
§ 107 and common law traditions, one may use copyrighted material to parody, comment, or criticize); see also Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 112-14 (discussing the Campbell Court's clarification of the fair use
defense). The Court in Campbell clarified the fair use defense for all works by requiring a consideration of the four statutory fair use factors without any presumptive
weight given to any single factor. See id.at 113 (acknowledging that the Court changed
its position to "an aggregate weighing of all four fair use factors"). The Court specifically abandoned the dicta in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984), by stating that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively... unfair...." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. The Court also departed from
its previous view that the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market
for the copyrighted work, was the most important factor to be considered, by stating
that "the importance of this factor will vary... with the relative strength of the showing
on the other factors." Id. at 590 n.21.
Parody has been defined as "the art of creating a new literary, musical, or other
artistic work that both mimics and renders ludicrous the style and thought of an original." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1441 n.4 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Note, The Parody Defense to
Copyight Infringement: ProductiveFair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1395
(1984)); see also infra note 82 (stating the Supreme Court's definition of parody for
copyright cases); infra text accompanying notes 149-51 (defining parody for an economic purpose).
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ples and applies them to relevant aspects of copyright law. I then
propose an economic model based on a survey of existing scholarly
models to evaluate parody in fair use and discuss the limitations of the
model. Finally, Part III explains the Second Circuit's decision in Leibovitz and explores whether the decision is consistent with the economic model. The Comment closes with the conclusion that the Second Circuit's decision is not consistent with the results reached by an
economic approach to the fair use defense for works of parody.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview ofDerivative Works and the FairUse Doctrine
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "[p]romote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings. " 1 The

dual aims of copyright law are to stimulate creativity and to disseminate knowledge in order to enrich culture and foster the growth of
learning for the public welfare. 19 Since 1790, Congress has passed a
number of copyright statutes to meet these ends. 20 To stimulate creativity, copyright law provides personal economic incentives by granting
an author exclusive control over an original, expressive work.2' Such
exclusive control, however, is limited in time to ensure the dissemination of such intellectual works into the public domain.n Thus, the law
Is U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good.").
For a general historical perspective of copyright law, see ROBERT A. GORMAN &
JANE C. GiNSBURG, COPYRIGHT 1-12 (5th ed. 1999).

The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful
Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with services rendered.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). But see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51 (1991) (determining that the ultimate goal of copyright
law is to encourage the production of new works and not necessarily to compensate
the author of such works).
As stated by the legislative report on the Copyright Act of 1909:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider... two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the
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balances the creative incentives to an author by granting a monopoly,
with the proper public access to those works by limiting the time of
the monopoly status23
An author usually receives adequate economic incentives to create
original works and share them with the public since a copyright monopoly grants exclusive control of the rights to reproduce, distribute,
and display a work.24 The copyright monopoly may stifle creativity in
public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.
H. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). The Supreme Court has recognized that in the limited grant "an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired." Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, copyright protection lasts for a term of 28 years
from the date of publication, though it may be renewed for an additional term of 28
years. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 304(a) (1994) (stating length of copyright protection).
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, works created afterJanuary 1, 1978 are protected for
the life of the author plus seventy years from the author's death. See id.
23 See Landes & Posner, supranote 2, at 326 ("Striking
the correct balance between
access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law."). Judicially created
copyright doctrines attempt to achieve a balance between monopoly and access. See
Leval, supra note 1, at 1109 & nn.22-23 (discussing the three judicially created copyright doctrines addressing this balance). First, copyright law extends only to expression, not to ideas or facts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(b) (1994) (copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression," but not to "ideals]" or concepts); Bakerv. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879)
(holding that copyright of the expression of an idea does not grant a copyright in the
underlying idea or system). Second, facts are not within the copyright protection. See
Feist 499 U.S. at 347 ("The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has
merely discovered its existence."). Finally, the fair use doctrine protects access to certain works that would otherwise be infringements. See infra text accompanying notes
37-38 (describing the purpose of the fair use defense).
24 SeeWendyJ. Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure: A Structuraland
Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1601 (1982) (determining that the dual aims of copyright-financial incentive to authors and promotion
of science and the useful arts-rarely conflict because authors are given adequate
compensation for their efforts); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 states that
an author has the exclusive rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
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certain circumstances since it also extends to the author the right to
prepare derivative works.25 This might discourage a second author

from building upon the work of the original author during the existence of the original copyright.
A derivative work transforms or adapts one or more preexisting
works such that the product constitutes an original work of authorship.26 A derivative work may be a translation of a book or, as in Leibovitz, a movie poster based on the cover of a magazine. Copyright protection in derivative works extends only for those original elements
contributed by the derivative author.27 As such, a derivative copyright
in no way affects the copyright in the underlying work, which rests entirely with the author of that work. 2s Although the amount of contribution necessary to reach the threshold of originality is somewhat
ambiguous,2 courts generally agree that derivative works require more
than trivial adaptations to original works to warrant copyright protection.30
The problem of providing an author with control over derivative
works thus becomes evident. Since derivative works necessarily are
creative and the dissemination of such works enriches the public domain, society should encourage their creation. Yet, the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works rests solely with authors who may refuse to
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
Id.

See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994) ("The subject matter of copyright.. includes
compvilations and derivative works....").
See id. § 101 (defining derivative works as "work[s] based upon one or more preexisting works").
27 See id. § 103(b) ("The copyright in a. . . derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
25

material employed in the work... .").

See id. ("The copyright in such [derivative] work is independent
of.. . any copyright protection in the preexisting material.").
For example, disagreement over adequate separation from the original work has
arisen in the context of art and sculptural reproductions. In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,Judge Posner ruled that a derivative work "must be substantially different from
the underlying work to be copyrightable." 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). By contrast, in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, the court found that despite an extremely precise level of exactitude, a replica could still possess sufficient originality to warrant
copyright protection. 177 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)
(holding that the Constitution only affords copyright protection to works that possess
more than a de minimis amount of creativity); L. Batin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("To extend copyrightability to miniscule variations
would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent
on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work.").
28
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allocate such a right.3' There are two reasons why the copyright monopoly for derivative works may be overly broad.3 2 First, "all intellectual creative activity is in part derivative" or secondary 3 Authors frequently create new works by borrowing or building upon previous
works while adding original expression of their own.? Second, fundamental areas of intellectual activity, such as philosophy, criticism,
history, and the natural sciences, necessarily require reference to previous works.35 Stated another way, " [m] onopoly protection of intellectual property that impede [s] referential analysis and the development
of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process.'O As a resuit, to achieve an adequate enrichment of culture, some leeway must
be given to derivative authors to freely utilize previously created and
copyrighted works.
To address the excessive protection received by an original author
to prepare derivative works, copyright law provides the affirmative defense of fair use, 7 which permits a defendant's reasonable use of
31

See Michael A. Chagares, Parody orPiracy: The ProtectiveScope of the FairUse Defense

to Copyright Infringement Actions RegardingParodies,12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 229, 23233 (1988) (discussing the fundamental conflict in the law between an author's exclusive right to his work and the fundamental goal of copyright "to encourage creative
endeavors and their dissemination throughout society").
32 See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1602 (asserting that the
primary goal of copyright
is promotion of the useful arts and sciences, and that when a conflict exists between
this goal and the author's right to monopoly protection, the author's right must "give
way before a social need for access"); Leval, supra note 1, at 1109 ("Notwithstanding
the need for monopoly protection of intellectual creators to stimulate creativity and
authorship, excessively broad protection would stifle, rather than advance, the objective.").
Leval, supranote 1, at 1109.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) ("Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which
was well known and used before." (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436))).
35 See 7 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (enumerating fundamental intellectual pursuits requiring reference to previous works).
36 Leval, supranote
1, at 1109.
37 See supra note 3 (defining the fair use doctrine).
First Amendment considerations also accompany the public interest in dissemination of derivative works. The Supreme Court has stated that the laws of the Copyright Act sufficiently embrace such
First Amendment concerns. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting that First Amendment rights are embodied in the Copyright Act's identification of copyrightable expressions). Indeed, courts have rejected
challenges to copyright infringement based on First Amendment arguments. See, e.g.,
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999)
("We have repeatedly rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by
and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.").
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copyrighted material without an author's consent. Fair use provides
the public, and subsequent authors, with socially desirable access to
intellectual works while maintaining an author's incentive to create by
respecting the author's right to control derivative uses of his creation."' Generally speaking, in Leibovitz, the fair use inquiry weighed
both the social benefit derived from Paramount's use of Leibovitz's
photograph and the proper reward and incentive for her creativity.
Of course, evaluating such a delicate balance has never been easy; a
panel of three judges that included Judge Learned Hand once described the fair use doctrine as "the most troublesome in the whole
law of copyright." 9
As ajudicially created doctrine, the oft-cited words ofJustice Story
guided common law adjudication of fair use:
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature
and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
40 or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.
Congress, by section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, codified
Justice Story's language into four statutory factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the 41use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Congress, however, realized the importance of the developed case
law in codifying the fair use provisions4 2 and, consequently, left the

courts with the task of interpreting the four factors.

38

For other judicially created doctrines that balance access with monopoly, see

supra note 23.
,, Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
40 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.G.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
41 Copyright Act of 1976 § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). For a more detailed description of the Supreme Court's analysis of the four factors, see infra text accompanying notes 78-98.
42 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680 (clarifying that the congressional intent in § 107 is to "restate the presentjudicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in anyway").
43 In a fair use analysis, courts are permitted "to avoid rigid application of
the

copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster." Iowa State Univ. Research Found. Inc. v. American Broad. Co.,
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
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B. Parody as FairUse
1. Pre-CampbelDevelopments

Parody has been recognized as an independent and important art
form for centuries. 44 Defined as "a literary or musical work in which
the style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in
ridicule,"4 a parody is a method of comment and criticism that humorously imitates an underlying work by focusing on its weaknesses.46

A successful parody requires taking a sufficient amount of expression
47
from an underlying work to recognize, or "conjure up" the original.
As a result, an author might sue a parodist who could be infringing on
the author's exclusive right to prepare a derivative work.48
To make a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a plaintiff
must prove: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original." 49 Assuming that
the first element is met,50 the second element may be satisfied by showing direct evidence that the defendant copied the material, or by
showing both that the defendant had "access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work" and that the "defendant's work is substantially similar to
the plaintiff's copyrightable material.""' Thus, to avoid a suit for infringement, a parodist who takes material for a derivative work first
must secure the consent of the original author. 2 Courts, however, will
44 For a general historical account of parody and copyright law, see Yankwich,
33

CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1133-37 (1995).

45 WEBSrER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 857 (9th
ed. 1989).

See supra note 17 (defining parody); infra note 82 (stating the Supreme Court's
definition of parody for copyright cases).
47 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.
1997) (adopting a test where "the parodist is permitted a fair use of a copyrighted work
if it takes no more than is necessary to 'recall' or 'conjure up' the object of his par46

°dy43'See Alfred C. Yen, Wen Authors
Won't Sel" Parody,Fair Use, and Efficiency
in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 86 (1991) ("[I]t is clear that parodies infringe the
author's right to control creation of 'derivative works.' Since parodies always borrow
and recast the plot, words, and style of a preexisting original, they necessarily fall under the definition of derivative work.").
49 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
so A certificate of registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of a
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994) ("In anyjudicial proceedings the certificate of
a registration ... shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright
."); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
...
that the presumption of validity may be rebutted).
51 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992).
52 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (explaining that the
right to pre-
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construe section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act to permit a fair use defense for works of parody, 3 as such works "are valued forms of criticism, encouraged because this sort of criticism itself fosters the creativity protected by the copyright law."54 Therefore, a defendant who
takes a substantive amount of copyrighted material without securing
the permission of the owner may defend the parody as a fair use of the
original work.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, in
which the Court attempted to clarify the fair use defense for works of
parody, an analysis of lower court decisions under section 107 concerning parodies reveals a variety of inconsistencies.55 Under the first
factor, the purpose and the nature of the parody, courts differed in
their reactions to a parodist's commercial motive. Some courts, such
as the Second Circuit, simply presumed that any commercial motive
weighed against fair use.- Courts such as the Ninth Circuit also presumed that a commercial purpose weighed against fair use, but permitted the defendant to rebut this presumption by convincing the
court that the parody did not "unfairly diminish the economic value
of the original."57 One court even refused to consider the commercial

pare a derivative work rests with the original author).
53 Typical fair uses listed in the statute include the use of
copyrighted works for
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1994). However, "types of uses beyond the six enumerated in the preamble to
section 107 may also be considered. Parody is a common example of such a use." H.R.
REP. No. 102-836, at 3 n.6 (1992); see also Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying § 107, the court determined that
"[p] arody is regarded as a form of social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value").
54 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310
(2d Cir. 1992).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (articulating
the four main factors of a fair use inquiry); Lisa M. Babiskin, Oh, Pretty Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 8HARV. J.L. & TcH. 193, 196 (1994) (noting that lower

courts have "produced an inconsistent and confusing body of case law"); Anatasia P.
Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and Campbell v.

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 788-91 (1996) (providing examples of
inconsistencies in lower court decisions prior to Campbell).

See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) ("While commer-

cial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the
alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial
gain."); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (determining that defendant's commercial purpose alone prevented a finding

of fair use).
57Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (presuming that a commercial
motive would weigh against a finding of fair use, but allowing the presumption to be
rebutted by a showing that the parody's true purpose is social commentary).
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motive in its analysis."
In determining whether a work constituted a parody, courts typically would assess whether it contained direct commentary on the
original work or rather a commentary on society at large. Courts often held that humorous or satirical work gained protection under the
fair use doctrine only if the copied work was the target of the work in
question. 9 Otherwise, the reasoning suggests, there would be no
need to "conjure up" the original in an audience's mind, and there
6°
would be no justification for borrowing from it.
For example, in
Fisher v. Dees, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's song,
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue," successfully constituted fair use parody because the song clearly poked fun at the original Johnny Mathis song
"When Sunny Gets Blue."61 Other courts, however, determined that a
defendant's work did not need specifically to parody the plaintiffs
material to find a fair use. For example, in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National BroadcastingCo., the District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that "[t]o the extent that [other cases] can be read to
require that there be an identity between the song copied and the
subject of the parody, this Court disagrees." 62
One court refused to consider all the fair use factors after determining that the work at issue was not a parody. In Tin PanApple, Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., the District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that a beer commercial with actors imitating the rap
group "The Fat Boys" did not qualify as a parody because it did not
contribute "something new for humorous effect or commentary. "6 As
a result, the advertisement was not entitled to the fair use defense.6
53 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 131 (N.D.

Ga. 1981) (finding that the defendant's parody, appearing in a magazine, was a social
commentary and not a commercial use that weighs against a fair use).
59 See Fisher,794 F.2d at 436 (finding fair use when "it was clear... that Dees's
version was intended to poke fun at the composers' song, and at Mr. Mathis's rather singular vocal range"); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 n.15 (9th Cir.
1978) (determining that it was not fatal "that the 'Air Pirates' were parodying life and
society in addition to parodying the Disney characters").
60 See MCA, 677 F.2d at 185 (finding that "if the copyrighted song is not at least in
part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it up").
61 See Fisher,794 F.2d at 436 (determining that direct commentary of Dees's song
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue" was necessary for a fair use ofJohnny Mathis's original song,
"When Sunny Gets Blue").
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 623
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(quoting ElsmereMusic, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1).

See d. (refusing to consider the fair use factors since the entirely for-profit adver-
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Inconsistencies among the lower courts also are apparent in analyzing various applications of the third factor of fair use, the substantiality of the taking. Some lower courts held that excessive copying for
use in a parody precluded a fair use defenser while others found that
copying an entire work did not preclude a finding of fair use.6 Most

courts realized, however, that the copying must be substantial enough
to "conjure up" the original, 67 as a parodist must rely heavily on the
original work to adequately imitate.6s
These inconsistencies demonstrate that prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell, the lower courts' application of section
107 to works of parody was in a state of disarray. Although the equitable approach of fair use balances the divergent interests of the original author and the parodist in a case-by-case manner ts the lower
courts failed to act consistently in determining what uses should be
deemed fair.70

tisement did not even qualify as a parody).
See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods.v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (determining that the defendant's copying of the plaintiff's Disney characters in their entirety was more than "necessary to place firmly in the reader's mind the parodied work
and those specific attributes that are to be satirized"); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[P]ermissible parody of the
copyright article is not a complete copy of the original.").

See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1986) (asserting that some case law indicates "that the copying of an entire work
does not preclude fair use perse").
67 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986) (agreeing with
the reasoning of the district court in Elsmere); Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1 ("[T]he concept of 'conjuring up' an original came into the copyright law not as a limitation... but as a recognition that a parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting
evocation of an original in order to make its humorous point."); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Prods., Inc., 1981 WL 1402, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (finding fair use even
though the defendant copied more than necessary to "conjure up" the original).
66

SeeJulie Bisceglia, Parody and Copyght Protection: Turning the BalancingAct into a
JugglingAct, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 17 (1987) ("Parody by its nature demands close imitation, and any attempt to limit its scope will correspondingly limit the
parodist in his craft.").
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(determining that fair use calls for a case-by-case analysis because it involves a mixed
question of fact and law); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued:
Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 687 (1993) ("Fair
use is a weighing process involving nonexclusive and multifaceted factors, not an exercise in computation.").
70 See Chagares, supra note 31, at 235 (determining that
as a result of the courts'

"application to the facts of the small number of published opinions dealing with the

issue of copyright infringement and parody, decisions have been inconsistent and ir-

reconcilable").

20001

AN ECONOMICANALYSIS OFFAIR USE

2. The Supreme Court's Decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,Inc.
In Campbe,471 the Supreme Court determined whether the rap
group 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman"
constituted a fair use.2 Although 2 Live Crew offered to pay a fee and
recognize Orbison and Dees as the creators, the plaintiff, Acuff-Rose,
refused to grant 2 Live Crew permission to use the song.7 Despite this
refusal, 2 Live Crew created the parody entitled "Pretty Woman," and
released the song, giving Orbison, Dees, and Acuff-Rose credit for
authoring and publishing the original version.74 Acuff-Rose sued for
copyright infringement. The district court granted 2 Live Crew's motion for summaryjudgment.7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the defendant failed to overcome the presump76
tion that the commercial nature of the song made the use unfair.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether 2
Live Crew's commercial parody could be a fair use."7 After providing
a brief history of the fair use doctrine, the Court noted that any fair
use analysis required a flexible, case-by-case application of the four
prongs in section 107.78 With the stage set, the Court evaluated 2 Live
Crew's song under the four factors.
Under the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the
Court stated that the inquiry should focus on "whether the new work
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
See id. at 574 (asserting that "2 Live Crew's song would be an infringement of
Acuff-Rose's rights in 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' under the Copyright Act of 1976... but for
a finding of fair use through a parody").
See id. at 572-73 (describing 2 Live Crew's manager's offer to "afford all credit for
ownership and authorship of the original song to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison" and
Acuff-Rose's agent's response letter, which stated, "'I am aware of the success enjoyed
by "The 2 Live Crews", but I must inform you that we cannot permit the use'").
74 See id. at 573.
See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The district court applied the four statutory factors of § 107 and found that the commercial nature of the
parody did not make it presumptively unfair. See id. at 1154. The district court also
found that 2 Live Crew "appropriatetd] no more from the original than is necessary to
accomplish reasonably its parodic purpose." Id. at 1157. As to the fourth factor, the
court found that the parody likely would not have a negative impact on the market for
the plaintiff's song. See id.
6 See Campbell 972 F.2d at 1439 (presuming and holding that use of the song was
unfair due to the commercial nature of the use).
7510
U.S. at 574.
78 See id. at 577 (stating that "[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line
rules,
for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis").
71
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merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation ... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character.... [I] t asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative."' 79 Encouraging transformative creations, the
Court reasoned, furthers the goal of copyright-to promote the sciences and useful arts." The Court found that parodies possess transformative value because they provide "social benefit."1 Thus, the
Court firmly decided that commercial parodies could claim protection
under the fair use defense.
The Court then defined parody and distinguished it from a work
of satire. A parody, the Court stated, "needs to mimic an original to
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's.. . imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and
so requires justification for the very act of borrowing."t s Thus, the
Court found that a derivative work is only a parody capable of fair use
protection if the work could "reasonably... be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.'84 Finally,
under the first factor, the Court explicitly warned against treating a
commercial use as presumptively unfair, as it determined that such
purpose "is only one element of the first factor enquiry.""5 The Court
concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 2 Live
Crew's parody presumptively was unfair."'

Considering the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, 7 the Court found that the creative aspect of Orbison's underlyId. at 579 (citations omitted); see also Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose:

79

Justice Souter's Rescue of FairUse, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 19, 23 (1994) [hereinafter Rescue of Fair Use] (stating that the Court's opinion in Campbell "thus restores the
lost emphasis on 'productive use,' but now in the context of a far more sophisticated
discussion, related in every detail to the basic objectives of copyright doctrine").
so See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (determining that "[sluch works thus lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of

copyight").
IId.
82

See id. at 580-81 (defining a parody, for the purposes of copyright law, as "the use

of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in
part, comments on that author's works"). In a footnote, the Court defined a satire as

"a work 'in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed with ridicule.'" Id. at 581 n.15
(quoting 14 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1989)).
85 Id. at 580-81.
84 Id. at 583.
85 Id. at 584. The Court stated, however, that "the force
of that tendency will vary
with the context." Id. at 585.
86 See id. at 58384.
87

The second factor requires courts to recognize that some works are
better in-
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ing work "is not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody
case, since
parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive
"s
works.

As to the third factor, the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the Court pointed to the
first factor, the parodic purpose of the use, and the fourth factor, the
potential market harm on the original work.ts The Court noted, as
previous courts have,90 that when a parody targets an original work, it
must be able to "conjure up" at least enough of the work to enable
audience recognition. 9' The more that an original is copied verbatim,
however, the less transformative the value, and the more likely a negative effect on the value of the original will occur. 2 The Court remanded to the lower court for •a determination
of whether 2 Live
•
93
Crew's use amounted to excessive copying.
Finally, the Court found that, in addressing the fourth factor,
courts should consider the transformative nature of the parody rather
than its commercial nature when evaluating the parody's likely market
harm to the original. 94 The Court reasoned that the more transformatended for copyright protection than others. See id. at 586 (concluding that it is more
difficult to establish fair use when works "closer to the core of intended copyright protection" are copied). To be copyrightable under § 102, a work must be an original
work of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). Those works with creative expressions, as opposed to merely factual works, get a higher level of copyright protection.
SeeFeist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (explaining
that the creator's work "lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere
selection into copyrightable expression"); supra note 30 (discussing the requirement of
creativity). Thus, a finding of fair use is more likely when the underlying work is one
of factual nature. SeeStewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (reasoning that there
is greater need to distribute factual works than works of fiction).
Campbel 510 U.S. at 586.
See id. at 586-87 ("[T]he extent of the permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use ....The facts bearing on [the third] factor will also
tend to address the fourth ....
').
90See supranotes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing other courts' analyses of
the third factor in parody cases).
91 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (stating that a parody should take "at least
enough
of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable").
See id. at 587-88 ("[A] work composed primarily of an original, particularly its
heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.").
See id. at 589 ("As to the music, we express no opinion whether repetition of the
bass riff is excessive copying, and we remand to permit evaluation of the amount taken
See id. at 591 (examining the effects of transformation from duplication and
concluding that transformative uses are less likely to cause market harm).
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tive a parody, the less certain market substitution becomes. 95 In that
light, the transformative parody and the original "usually serve different market functions."6 Furthermore, the role of the courts is to distinguish those parodies that actually harm the market for the original
from those that merely suppress demand through criticism.
The Court emphasized that the potential negative effect on Orbison's market for licensing potential derivative works also must be
examined. That is, the Court required an inquiry into whether "a potential rap market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parody, rap
version."9 8 The Court then remanded for a determination of the severity of harm to the market for the original caused by 2 Live Crew's

song.
Although the Supreme Court's decision arguably provides the
lower courts with a detailed framework from which to tackle the fair
use defense for works of parody,'" it left much discretion to the lower
courts. Importantly, the Court required a threshold determination
that the work criticizes or comments on the original work, and
thereby qualifies as a parody rather than a satire, which bolsters an argument for the fair use defense.'O The required threshold determination poses the threat that lower courts will overemphasize the distinction between parody and satire in evaluating the remaining statutory
factors. 1 2 Given this type of subjective analysis, the lower courts are
95 See id. at 580 n.14 (explaining that market substitution may occur where "a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk of serving as a substitute for
the original or licensed derivatives").
9 Id. at 591.
97 See i& at 592-93 (stating that "the role of the courts is to distinguish
between
'[b]iting criticism [that merely) suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[,
which] usurps it'" (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438
(9th Cir. 1986))). Addressing the market for other parodies, the Court cautioned that
"there is no protectible derivative market for criticism. The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop." Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
See id. at 594 (asserting that "[tihe evidentiary hole [on the fourth factor] will
doubtless be plugged on remand").
100
See Rescue ofFairUse, supra note 79, at 23 (submitting that the Campbell decision
"has restored valid compass bearings to the fair use doctrine by relating it in each of its
component inquiries to the overarching central purpose of copyright").
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (defining parody and satire, and
distinguishing between the two).
102In Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin.Books USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit determined
that the defendant could not claim fair use of Dr. Seuss's copyrighted material. See 109
F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's injunction order prohibiting publication and distribution of the work). The court, applying the parody/satire
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cast as "gatekeeper[s] to fair use protection,"'03 and parodists and
authors may continue to face uncertainty in lower court opinions.!
II. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE FAIR USE DEFENSE AND PARODY
A. Basic EconomicPrinciples

Because the law of copyright is based on economic principles,"
economic theories may provide a pathway around the obstacles that

arise from parody cases. Since every fair use analysis requires an exploration into the fundamental tenets of copyright law,"° economic
distinction discussed in Campbell found that the defendant's book, "The Cat NOT in
the Had" was a satire because it failed to target the "substance" of the underlying work.
See id. at 1401 (suggesting that the authors mimicked Dr. Seuss's style for attention and
ease, not criticism or ridicule). The categorization of the work as a satire has been
criticized as a narrow construction of the threshold determination as defined by Campbell See, e.g., Mary L. Shapiro, Comment, An Analysis of the FairUse Defense in Dr. Seuss
Enterprises v. Penguin, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1 (1998); Jason M. Vogel, Note,
The Cat in the Hat's Latest Bad TicLk The Ninth Circuit s Narrowing of the Parody Defense to
CopyrightInfringement in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 287 (1998). Rather than addressing whether a new work could "reasonably be
perceived" as having a parodic character in order to qualify as a parody, the Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Kennedy's concurrence-that a parody "target[s] the original,
and notjust its general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole."
Dr.Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell 510 U.S. at 597 (KennedyJ., concurring)).
The Ninth Circuit's determination that the purpose of the work was not parody, but
satire, heavily influenced the court in its analysis of the remaining statutory factors. See
Dr.Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1399-1403.
Another court recently implemented this threshold distinction in a case where the
use more clearly qualified as a satire. In Williams v. Columbia BroadcastingSystems, Inc.,
the court found that the use of a "Saturday Night Live" character, "Mr. Bill," was "unquestionably intended as a good natured jibe of the Navy and its personnel," and not
of the original character. 57 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968-69 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Campbel4
510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J, concurring)). In classifying the segment as a satire, the
court stated that "[a] parody does not gain protection of the Fair Use Doctrine if it
merely uses the protected work as a means to ridicule another object." Id. (citing
Campbel 510 U.S. at 580).
Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., What Is
FairGameforParodists?,18 LO. L.A. ENT. L.J. 75,98 (1997).
104See id. at 79 (arguing that the distinction between satire and parody should be
left to the parodists). Piele found that "at least one district court.., made a distinction between a satire and a parody that appears to directly contradict common sense."
Id. at 94. Furthermore, "[a]t best, the differentiation between parodies and satires is
strained. Courts should not have the discretion to make a subjective determination
about what an original work represents or what a secondary work is attempting to say
about it." Id. at 98.
105 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting the "economic
philosophy"
underlying Congress's power to grant monopoly protection to authors).
106 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("The fair use doctrine thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
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models should guide courts in analyzing and applying the fair use defense in parody cases. 107 Indeed, as Professor Fisher states: "economic[s] ...proves capable of providing insights into the fair use

doctrine that all but the staunchest critics of the methodology would
find helpful."0 8
1. Economics of Copyright Law
The goal of most economic analyses is to arrive at an economically
efficient solution.'" A Kaldor-Hicks efficient solution represents "that
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that
a further change would not so improve the condition of those who
gained by it that they Lould compensate those who lost from it and
still be better off than before.""' A central idea in modem economics
is that self-interested actions of individuals lead to an efficient solution

would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990))).
107 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failureand the
Parody Defense in Copy ight, 21 AIPLA QJ. 305, 306 (1993) ("[C]ourts and commentators are converging on a view of copyright that emphasizes the economic structure of
its rules and doctrines."); see alsoWilliam W. Fisher HI, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1696-97 (1988) (arguing that "manyjudges are likely to
be attracted to an economic approach-not only because of the current general popularity of the method, but also because intellectual property law has long been considered a field especially amenable to instrumental modes of analysis").
108Fisher, supra note 107, at 1697.
109 See A. MITCHELL POriNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMIcs 7 (2d
ed. 1989) ("Economists traditionally concentrate on how to maximize [efficiency, or]
the size of the pie ... ."). Efficient solutions are defined technically as "Pareto efficient" or "Pareto optimal." Id.at 7 n.4. A Pareto efficient solution exists if there is no
change possible to make one person better off without making another worse off.
Stated another way, a solution is inefficient if one person can be made better off without making anyone else worse off. See id.
A related concept is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. "A Kaldor-Hicks efficient state of affairs is one in which no individual or group of individuals can be made better off without inflicting losses on others which exceed the amount of the gains." Yen, supra note
48, at 94; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 12 (3d ed.
2000) (providing an example of a Pareto efficient solution).
110Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972). An efficiency
analysis stems from the assumption that the value a person places in property reduces
to money, and that money can always be redistributed among individuals without any
additional cost. SeeYen, supranote 48, at 106 (discussing the fungible nature of money
and its role in efficiency analysis). This assumption is important in reducing the analysis to a single scale "by which to measure the consequences of changing any status
quo." Id. For an explanation of the conditions required to reach an efficient solution,
see infra note 113.
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under certain conditions." The pursuit of self-interest promotes a
number of mutually beneficial transactions, or voluntary exchanges,
which continue until further possibility of such beneficial exchanges is
exhausted.112 Such exchanges will lead to an efficient state under perfect market conditions, regardless of the legal rule given effect.

3

In the exchange of copyrighted works, however, perfect market
conditions do not exist."' The monopoly protection granted to
authors is a necessary incentive due to the unique nature of copyrighted works as public goods, an aspect which functions as a market
impediment." 5 A public good, as distinguished from a private good,
has two defining characteristics. First, the public good may be used by
an unlimited number of people without exhausting it as a resource.116
Second, those who benefit from the use of a public good may not easily prevent others from enjoying the benefits as well. That is, once
I SeeYen, supranote 48, at 95 (indicating that the proposition "flows from the assumption that rational individuals will pursue what they subjectively believe is in their
self interest").
11

See id.

See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1611. This proposition, entitled the "Coase Theorem," was first developed in an article by Robert Coase. SeeR. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For a detailed explanation of the Coase Theorem,
see POIINSW, supranote 109, at 11-14.
There are three perfect market conditions, or "conditions of perfect competition,"
that must be satisfied to result in an efficient solution. Gordon, supra note 24, at 1607.
First, all costs and benefits must be borne by the persons within the transaction and
not by persons external to it. See id. (indicating that "external benefits" may affect a
resource user's "willingness to pay for the resource" and "might understate his ability
to use [the resource] in a way that serves social needs"). Second, perfect market conditions also "require[] perfect knowledge; for example, consumers must know the
qualities and characteristics of all available products, as well as the prices and locations
of the various sellers." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, perfect competition requires
the absence of transaction costs. See id. at 1608 (noting that "it must be costless" to
"obtain knowledge .... locate all persons affected by a transaction," bargain over
"prices and terms," and "maintain an enforcement mechanism to ensure [adherence
to the bargain]").
114 See Winslow, supra note 55, at 773 (determining that perfect market conditions
do not exist due to the characterization of copyrighted works as public goods).
1s See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 326 ("A distinguishing
characteristic of
intellectual property is its 'public good' aspect.").
116 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach
to FairUse in an Era
of Copyright PermissionSystems, 5J. INML. PROP. L. 1, 22-23 (1997) (discussing the public good nature of copyrighted works). A public good is a good for which no one
competes (non-rivalrous) and that no one owns exclusively (non-excludable). In contrast, a private good may only be consumed once. See Winslow, supra note 55, at 773
11

n.26 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1996)).
117 See COOTER & ULEN, supranote 109, at 42-43 (discussing the free-rider problem

with public goods).
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the good is provided for any individual, its enjoyment, in practice,
naturally extends to everyone else in society. Thus, because those who
have not paid (often referred to as "free-riders")" 8 may use the good,
"public goods usually will be under-produced if left to the private
market."" 9
Since it is not possible for the military to defend a particular
house from nuclear attack while leaving the neighbor's house vulnerable to enemy fire, national defense serves as a classic example of a
public good.
Some individuals would purchase the defense, but
many people rationally would rely on their neighbors to purchase the
protection. Because a private national defense provider could not
possibly discriminate by providing service only to those who paid,
there would be a shortage of national defense produced, as the
amount of funding received would not adequately compensate the
private firm.
The free-rider principle, therefore, suggests that "unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals
act in their common interest, rationa4 self-interested
individuals will not
22
act to achieve their common or group interests."'
Similarly, books and other creative works subject to copyright protection also possess qualities of public goods.'2 3 An author likely will
not be willing to incur the costs to create a work if free-riders may
copy that work without adequately compensating her. At a minimum,
the author
will seek to recover those costs associated with creating the
12 4
work.
The costs associated with creating or authoring a work, however,
almost always are higher than the costs associated with reproducing
the work. As a result, the value placed on a work by society may exceed what an author is able to capture, and the author may not have
118Id.

119Gordon, supranote 24, at 1611.

120See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 42 (discussing the public good
nature of
national defense).
1
See id. ("If private profit-maximizing firms are the only providers of national
defense, too little of that good will be provided.").
1 MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGIc OF COLLECTIVEACTION
2 (1965).
123 See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1611 ("Books and inventions exhibit certain public goods characteristics.").

See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 327. The costs associated with creating
a
work, or the "cost of expression," primarily include "the author's time and effort plus
the cost to the publisher of soliciting and editing the manuscript and setting it in type."
Id. It is assumed that an author will only create a work if the difference between the
expected revenues from the books and the cost of making copies for sale equals or exceeds the cost of expression. See id.
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sufficient incentive to invest her creativity in the work.'26 Thus, in order to allow the author to adequately capture some of the public value
of her work, copyright protection grants the power to prevent others
26
Copyfrom freely copying the work at a low cost of reproduction.
permitting
an
economic
incentives
by
implements
proper
right law
author to sell copies at a price that reflects, at a minimum, the cost of
creation.
Nevertheless, there are three reasons why an overemphasis on incentives to authors would unduly restrict societal access to desired
works. First, the greater the public access to information, the more
efficiently markets will operate.1 27 Second, as explained above and
again in economic terms below, authors frequently build upon previous works to create new ones.' 28 Access to prior works lowers the costs
of creating new ones,'2 9 which is socially desirable.2 Finally, granting
an unconstrained monopoly to an author forces certain consumers
out of the market. 3s Fortunately, copyright law addresses the need for
flexibility by recognizing the societal goal of access to copyrighted

See Loren, supra note 116, at 23 (noting that the public good nature of a work
can reduce an author's incentive to create).
126 See id. (describing the inventive-based rationale in copyright law that motivates
12

authors to invest a socially optimal amount of effort in their creations).
127 SeeWinslow, supranote 55, at 774 & n.32 (stating that it is better for the market,
and therefore in the public interest, that private economic decisions are well informed).
128 SeeYen, supranote 48, at 81 ("If copyright law outiawed all
borrowing from existing works, the creative process would surely grind to a halt, thereby depriving the
public of the very benefits copyright should secure."); supranotes 33-36 and accompanying text (explaining why the monopoly granted to authors may be too broad).
See Winslow, supra note 55, at 774 (noting that "the less authors may borrow
from previous works, the more costly it is for them to create new ones" (citation omitted)).
ISOHere I assume that there is no material limit on the amount of books that society needs. There may be, however, an overproduction of books, in which case a lower
cost of creation will not necessarily be socially desirable.
131 See Fisher, supra note 107, at 1700-05 (discussing the determination
of "optimal
levels of copyright protection"). Monopoly protection results in a certain inefficiency
termed "deadweight loss." AL at 1702. Deadweight loss stems from the concept that
one receiving monopoly protection will only charge up to a point where the marginal
revenue (the revenue from the last item sold) exceeds the cost of the last item sold.
But, as the monopolist charges a price substantially higher than the marginal cost of
that good, those consumers who would have paid above the marginal cost, but below
the monopoly price, will refuse to buy. See id. at 1702-03.
Thus, deadweight loss, as "measured by the total of the consumer surplus that
would have been reaped by the excluded consumers and the producer surplus that
would have been reaped by the copyright owner had he sold the work to them," results. Id.at 1702.
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works. The Copyright Act achieves this by limiting the duration of the
monopoly, 11 and by allowing borrowing from prior works even during
copyright protection through fair use.
To evaluate fully the economic justifications for fair use, it is first necessary to explore the allocation of the right to prepare derivative works.
2. The Economics of Derivative Works
In addition to the right to control the reproduction of a copyrighted work, copyright law allows an author to prevent others from
preparing derivative works. T3 Economically, granting this right to an
author furthers the goal of copyright law: to "induce the production
of the greatest amount of original works of authorship at the lowest
cost."'35 Yet, a precise economic justification for allocating this right
to an author, as opposed to a derivative author, is not without dispute.
Unlike the right to control reproduction of works, failure to allocate control over derivative works to an author is not likely to impede
the author's ability to recoup the fixed costs of creation.136 A derivative work is either an imperfect substitute for the original or is not a
substitute at all.1 7 For example, although a movie based on a play may
slightly affect the demand for the original, it will not necessarily usurp
the demand for the play.'3 8 A person who wants to see the play in English will not likely see or read the German translation of the play.3 9 As
Professor Landes and Judge Posner found, "it would be speculative to
conclude that without control over derivative works authors and publishers would not be able to cover the fixed costs of the original
work." 40 Economicjustification, therefore, must be found elsewhere.
Another justification for allocating the right to an original author,
rather than allowing free copying by a derivative author, may be to
132

See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998) (limiting generally the copyright term to life plus

seventy years).
133 See supranote 23 (discussing the fair use doctrine as a doctrine within copyright
law that allows taking from copyrighted works to achieve the goal of sufficient access).
134 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (defining
the rights of a copyright
owner and explaining derivative works).
135 Winslow, supra note
55, at 780.
15 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 353-54 (discussing
the scope of legal protection associated with derivative works).
137 See id. at 353-57 (explaining the concept of
a derivative work).
1S See Winslow, supra note 55, at 781 (arguing that a derivative work will not "undermine the original author's ability to recoup the fixed costs").
139 See id.
140 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 354.
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provide an incentive for the timely creation and dissemination of
141
works. This justification assumes that an author may create with the
expectation of a high demand for derivative works. Yet, as uncertainty
about demand for the original work is a concern upon creation, uncertainty regarding the market is an equal or greater concern for derivative works. Expectation of related revenue, thus, may be too
speculative to provide a persuasive incentive to create.1 3 Moreover, if
the law granted a derivative author copyright protection, the original
author may have an incentive to delay publication until the author has
created, or licensed the right to create, a derivative work in order "to
gain a head start on any would-be author of such a work."1 4 For example, to capture the maximum profit from a new play, an author
likely would delay publication or production of the play until she licensed the rights to make the related motion picture.
Professor Landes and Judge Posner posit an additional economic
justification for granting an original author a monopoly over derivative works: achievement of the lowest possible transaction costs.'4 5 For
example, without such an allocation, a publisher who wanted to publish a translation, written in a different language than that of the
original work, would have to transact with both the original author
and the translator. As stated by Landes and Posner, "this transaction,
with its attendant costs, can be avoided if the law places the power to
obtain both copyrights in the same person to begin with-and that is,
in effect, what the law does."' Many scholars agree that, on balance,

141

See id.at 355 (explaining the consequences if the derivative, not the original,

author is allowed to copyright derivative works).
142 See id. at 328 ("Uncertainty about demand is a particularly serious problem with
respect to artistic works, such as books, plays, movies, and recordings.... Sales may be
insufficient to cover the cost of expression....").
1
See id. at 354 (commenting on the speculative nature of the expectation of the
revenues from derivative works).
4 Id. at 355. Posner and Landes state that this reasoning also
may exist in the
realm of fair use. The fair use defense is less likely to succeed when a defendant copies
unpublished works. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,

569 (1985) (holding that a magazine's publication of an unauthorized copy of a manuscript is not fair use under the Copyright Act). Otherwise, "authors would have an incentive to incur heavy expenditures to prevent anyone from gaining access to the
works." Landes &Posner, supranote 2, at 355 n.39.
145 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 355 (proposing reduction of transaction
costs as a reason for giving an original author a monopoly over derivative works).
146 Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody FairUse?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
67, 69
(1992) ("It does not matter how much.., commercially more valuable ... the derivative work is. Transaction costs are minimized when all rights over the copyrighted
work are concentrated in a single pair of hands.").
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providing the original author with control over the preparation of derivative works is the most efficient allocation of such rights.' 4' Nevertheless, as the contributions of a derivative author and the value society places on that work increase, the more incentive a derivative
author
has, and the stronger the case becomes to allocate control to
48
her.
3. The Economics of Parodies and Fair Use
Works of parody involve "both a taking from a previous work and
an injection of creativity, large or small." 49 Because successful parody
requires taking enough copyrighted material to distort "the most striking peculiarities of subject matter and style" of an original,' an infringement likely occurs against the copyright holder, who has the
right to prepare the derivative work.5 Parodies, however, possess certain qualities that distinguish them from other derivative works and, as
a result, weaken the efficiency argument in favor of granting an original author control of such works.
Most parodies provide the public with both a popular form of
humor and a critical perspective of the original work . 152 Frequently,
parodists receive substantial financial rewards because society places a
high value on this type of work.5 Efficiency analysis suggests that a
parodist should bargain with an author and purchase the right to pre-

147

See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 354-55 (arguing that it is optimal to put

the right to prepare derivative works in the hands of the original author to promote
optimum timing of publication and to reduce transaction costs); Yen, supra note 48, at
95-97 (arguing that authors of derivative works may use the money they earn from the
work to pay original authors, which in turn increases the original authors' financial
incentives to create more material-a design that is assumed to be efficient as long as
the rights to create the work are more valuable in the borrower's hands than in those
of the author).
1 See Winslow, supra note 55, at 782 (recognizing that "a case can be
made for favoring derivative authors").
14 Posner, supranote 146, at 68 (citation omitted); see alsosupra notes 17 & 82
(defining parody).
I&
151 SeeYen, supranote 48, at 85-86 ("[I]t is clear that parodies infringe the
author's
right to control creation of 'derivative works.' Since parodies always borrow and recast
the plot, words, and style of a preexisting original, they necessarily fall under the definition of derivative work.").
152See id at 88-89 (arguing for "a cost-benefit analysis of the social consequences"
associated with parodies).
155 See id. at 100 (implying that a derivative work's social value is reflected
in the
price the public will pay for the work).
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pare a derivative work.'54 Unlike other derivative works, however, the
sale of parody rights involves potential humiliation to the author of
the underlying work. 5 If a parody provided the public with nothing
more than "a good laugh," most authors would not hesitate to license
their works, with the exception of authors of serious works who object
to their works being the subject of humor. In addition to humor,
however, parodies achieve a level of criticism.15

6

As such, those

"[a]uthors anxious to avoid being humiliated will seldom, if ever, voluntarily expose their own work to a critical parody."5 7 Such refusal to
license may be described as a no-consent case, where a transaction
fails due to an author's motive to censor."
For three reasons, the prevalence of no-consent cases in the parody context deflates the efficiency arguments that favored allocating
original authors the right to derivative uses. First, the public interest
in the dissemination of works of criticism presumably is strong for
works of parody.15 9 Such external benefits to society derived from
works of parody (referred to as "externalities"' 6 ) will lead to ineffi154

See id. (noting that economists assume "that individuals who want to create de-

rivative works will raise sufficient money to buy the necessary rights from the author").
HI See id at 93 ("[T]he sale of parody rights is vastly different from the sale of
other derivative rights.").
156 See id. at 91 (recognizing that parodies provide "a very unique
criticism of literary and social foibles").
157 I.
at 93. This result is also supported by empirical studies. See i. at 106 (discussing empirical evidence based on libel actions).
im See Winslow, supra note 55, at 793 (defining a no-consent case). A no-consent
case is distinguished from an implied-consent case, where an author is unwilling to
transact because of prohibitively high transaction costs. See id. at 793-99. Such a distinction stems from the language of the Supreme Court, describing fair use that is
"'based on authors' implied consent to reasonable uses of their works, or on an exception to authors' monopoly privileges needed in order to fulfill copyright's purpose to
promote the arts and sciences.'" Id. at 793 n.145 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F3d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1994)).
159 See Gordon, supranote 24, at 1634 ("Criticism is valuable, inter alia, because
the
market works to further the social good only when consumers have accurate information about the goods available."); supra text accompanying notes 53-54 (describing the
importance
of the
160
. fair use defense for works of parody).
Externalities
are those benefits or costs of an exchange that "may spill over onto
other parties than those explicitly engaged in the exchange." COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 109, at 40. An example of an external benefit, or positive externality, occurs
when every neighbor in a neighborhood enjoys the beauty of a single neighbor's landscape. An example of an external cost, or negative externality, occurs when every
member of a community coughs from one company's air pollution. Due to the inability of each producer to internalize the costs or benefits of the action, the positive externality will likely be underproduced and the negative externality will likely be overproduced in the absence of taxes or subsidies. See id. at 39 (providing examples of
external costs and benefits).
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ciency. 161 As the societal benefit extends far beyond that which may be
captured by the parodist, these positive externalities "are impossible to
internalize in any bargained-for exchange between the copyright
owner and the [parodist] .162 Thus, even though the dissemination of
the parody may be value-maximizing, the work will remain in the
hands of the original author.16 In such a case, the fair use doctrine
supplies the beneficial exchange where the market will not.
Second, in a no-consent case, the original author who refuses to
license effectively denies a market for works of parody. Consequently,
preventing delay in the dissemination of works no longer provides justification for allocating the monopoly over derivative works to the
original author 4 Finally, any benefit, conferred by minimizing transaction costs through concentrating the copyrighted work "in a single
pair of hands,"I6 is not realized without a transaction. Thus, in the
context of parody, efficiency concerns only weakly favor the original
author, if at all.1 66 The fair use defense for works of parody, therefore,
may save an otherwise inefficient allocation of rights.
B. Economic ModelsforFairUse andParody
1. Previous Economic Models Addressing Fair Use
for Works of Parody
Four scholars recently have formulated economic models to address the fair use defense for works of parody.167 First, the market failure approach, introduced by Professor Gordon in 1982, states that a
court should employ the fair use doctrine only when the market does
not provide socially desirable access to, and use of, copyrighted works,
161See Gordon, supranote 24, at 1630 (finding that, due to externalities, "the
mar-

ket cannot be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable transactions").
162 Loren, supra note 116, at 49.
& See id. at 50 ("The inability to internalize significant external benefits
is a type of
market failure that fair use must protect.").
16 See Winslow, supranote 55, at 785 (stating
that authors will not be induced to
create based on the prospect of licensing the right to prepare a parody, nor will they
likely delay publishing their work until they license parodies).
165 Posner, supra note 146, at 69.
1 SeeWinslow, supranote 55, at 785 (arguing
that the right of control over derivative works "constitute[s] at best a marginal inducement to more original creation").
167In 1988, Professor William Fisher wrote an important article
that examined the
fair use defense from an economic perspective. See Fisher, supra note 107, at 16981744. Although other scholars have relied on Fisher's insights to formulate their own
economic models, his model is not discussed in detail in this Comment.
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and even then, only if the original author would not be injured substantially from the uncompensated use.ee To evaluate market failure,
Professor
Gordon provides a three-part test to analyze all fair use
169
cases.
The first prong of the test requires a court to evaluate the market
and determine if a reason to mistrust it exists.170 Professor Gordon
suggests that both the impossibility or difficulty in achieving a market
bargain, and the existence of externalities and nonmonetizable interests, provide reasons to mistrust the market.17 1 In the second part of
the test, a court should determine if "the transfer to the defendant
[is] value-maximizing, as determined by weighing plaintiff's injury
against defendant's social contribution. " 1 Finally, if the first two
conditions are satisfied, the court should determine if a fair use would
cause the copyright owner substantial injury.ln If not, fair use should
be awarded to the defendant' 74
In applying Gordon's model to works of parody, transferring the
right to prepare a work of criticism to the defendant may be valuemaximizing because of the high social value of that form of criticism.
Information about the original work, including revelations of its flaws,
may be generated only through such critique. Further, reasons to
mistrust the market probably exist due to the anti-dissemination motives of authors who are "unlikely to license a hostile review or a parody" of their own work. 7 5 Market failure should be found, however,
"only when the defendant can prove that the copyright owner would
169See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1657 (asserting that the market failure approach is

not ajustification for court intervention whenever the market fails to reach "perfect"
results).
169See id.at 1626-27. Professor Gordon suggests the three-part
test best incorporates the economic functions served by copyright and the internal dynamics of the
copyright statute. Gordon provides evidence of the market approach in court decisions and congressional legislation. The description of her three-part test utilizes only
those portions which are relevant to the issue of parody, thus leaving out certain discussions of fair use, such as for educational purposes.

See iU
See id. at 1627-32 (describing why market barriers, such as transaction costs, external benefits and costs, and nonmonetizable interests, such as contribution to public
knowledge, are reasons for mistrusting the market).
1
Id. at 1626; see also id.at 1615-17 (explaining that "[i]f when the 'market failure'
were cured, the price that the owner would demand is lower than the price that the
user would offer, a transfer to the user will increase social value").
1
See id.at 1618-22 (describing the functions of the "substantial injury hurdle").
174See id. at 1618 ("Fair use should be denied whenever a substantial injury
appears
that will impair incentives.").
170
1

175

Id. at 1633.

916

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 148:889

refuse to license out of a desire ... to keep certain information from
the public."'76 Thus, for works of parody, one pivotal focus of
Gordon's analysis is the nature of an author's reluctance to license.
In 1992, Judge Posner provided an economically based, threepronged model for a parody defense.' 77 The first prong of Posner's
model distinguishes between parodies that use a copyrighted work as a
weapon to criticize or comment on something else, and those where
the target of the parody is the copyrighted work itself.178 He argues
that the fair use defense should be available for the latter, but not for
the former." 9 This proposal apparently turns on the fact that copyright holders, under normal circumstances, will license parodies that
use their works as a "weapon" aimed at something else. 80 As Posner
asks rhetorically, "why should the owner of the original be reluctant to
license the parody" in such a case?181 Posner's second prong requires
that the defense only be available when the parody does not take such
a large fraction of a work as to supplant the market for the original
work.182 Finally, under Posner's third prong, the taking of a small
amount of the original work should not be a permissible fair use,
given that some copying is required to achieve an acceptable level of
criticism.'82 Otherwise, Posner argues, a parodist easily could obtain a
license to use the work because a market transaction becomes feasible
where the parodist does not ridicule the original work.'m
In 1993, Professor Merges proposed an economic approach to the
issue of fair use in parody. 8 Merges's model focuses on a "transactional, or market-centered, account of the parody defense."' 86 The

176
177

Id. at 1634.
See Posner, supranote 146, at 71-72 (suggesting three limitations on the applica-

tion of the fair use defense to parodies).
178 See id. at 71 (recognizing that these uses may overlap and that distinguishing
between them can be difficult).
179 See id. ("[T]he doctrine should provide a defense to infringement
only if the
parody uses the parodied work as a target rather than as a weapon or ... simply as a
resource to create a comic effect.").
180 See id. (offering examples of works used as weapons to criticize something
else).
181 Id.
1
See id. at 70-72 ("The parodist should be entitled to take from the original no
more than is necessary to make the parody effective.").
183 See id.at 72.
184 See id. ("The less the parodist wants to take,
the easier it should be for him to
obtain a license from the owner of the copyright on the original work.").
185 See Merges, supra note 107, at 305 (arguing "that
the parody defense makes
sense when there is a clear failure in the market for parody licenses").
'8 Id. at 312.
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approach requires courts to determine if "a reasonable market transaction for the right to parody could be envisioned." 187 According to
Merges, the focus on market transaction injects more neutrality into
the fair use analysis by allowing "dissemination of every parody capable of generating a net profit to the parodist and copyright holder,"
rather than relying on a value assessment arising from the distinction
of whether a work is a parody or satire.Ies
Merges argues that this determination would be advanced by two
pieces of evidence. First, "a consensus of licensing experts agrees that
the parody will not appreciably injure the market for the original
work."'
Second, "prior to the release of the parody, the parodist
made an offer to pay a royalty that would generously compensate the
copyright holder."' 9' The requirements ensure, according to Merges,
that the fair use doctrine only applies where a parodist offers adequate compensation to the original author and such offer is refused 9'
Merges also discusses that the logic of compulsory licensing applies where the costs of entering into a series of voluntary transactions
exceed the surplus generated by the parties. 92 Costs that could impede a transaction include the risk of bargaining breakdown, which is
increased by the prospect of an embarrassing parody, or the costs of
overcoming a party's noneconomic resistance to bargain.' 93 In94 those
cases, the law must supply a transaction where the market fails.

Finally, in 1996, after the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell
Professor Winslow developed an economic test addressing parodies in
a three-part inquiry.195 According to Winslow, the model provides an
objective standpoint because it tends to avoid content-based distinctions, which separates it from previous models. 196 First, Winslow directs an inquiry into the likelihood of voluntary exchange, as such an
187 I.
l's Id.
18

Id at 307.

190Id.
191See

id. at 310 (stating that when the "refusal to license is based on a noneconomic motive... copyright law's preference for dissemination is too strong to give
any credence to such motives in such cases").
in See id at 309 (arguing that compulsory licensing is justified only where transactions costs exceed the generated surplus).
19 See id. at 309-10 (defining various
transaction costs).
1
See id at 310 (describing cases where "the logic of compulsory licensing applies").
195 See Winslow, supranote 55, at 809-12 (proposing a new,
more neutral approach
to the parody defense).
196 See

id. at 809.
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inquiry has the desirable effect of encouraging transactions.'" In determining such likelihood, one should examine the relationship between the parties and the reasons the original author wants to retain
the interest. ' Second, the public interest in dissemination should be
evaluated according to current case law.'" Finally, a court should determine the substantiality of the parodist's adaptations or contributions to the original work.2°' As the contributions increase, Winslow
argues, the greater the chance for fair use protection because it avoids
the market substitution 2011 and free-rider problems, 212 and it strengthens the parodist's claim to resource reallocation because the creativity
203
level is high.
2. A Proposed Model for Parody and Fair Use
Based in part on the economic models above, I propose a threepronged economic model to evaluate the fair use defense for works of
parody. The model maintains a flexible, case-by-case approach, as required by section 107. The factors of the model are as follows:
(1) the nature of the transaction, (2) the strength of the critical element, and (3) the amount of creative contributions. I have chosen
each factor to encompass distinct economic considerations. The purpose of the proposed model is to provide a practical method of
evaluation by consolidating the economic considerations and models
discussed above. 4

197See id.
198 See id. at 809-10 (suggesting that a court "look at the conduct
and relations of
the parties... [and] whether the copyright owner has refused to license the work
based on a legitimate desire to retain control over it as opposed to a desire to prevent
the publication of a parody").
9 See id. at 810-11 & n.223 (arguing that First Amendment
principles should be
considered when evaluating the public interest in dissemination and explaining that
the public interest would be affected by a work that qualifies as obscenity under First
Amendment law); see also supra note 37 (discussing the reaction of courts to First
Amendment arguments in light of the fair use defense).
20 See Winslow, supra note 55, at 811-12 (positing that "if the parodist
made only
trivial changes to the original, then fair use should be denied").
201 See supra note 95.
202 See supranotes 118-19 and accompanying text.
203

See id.

204 The

model is not meant, however, to explain or coincide with existing case law,

but to improve on it.
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a. The Nature of the Transaction

Presumably, parties litigate fair use due to the failure of the market to provide an avenue of voluntary exchange. In the first prong of
the inquiry, the nature of the transaction, one should explore the reason for the transaction's failure. As an initial matter, the parodist
must demonstrate that she attempted to offer reasonable compensaton" 5 to the original author before she used the work. 6 Of course,
considering whether a parodist attempted to transact may contradict
that which fair use provides-the allowance of free use of an original
author's work.21 7 Placing this initial burden on the parodist, however,
ensures at least the possibility of an ex ante transaction between the
parties.08 If the parodist did not attempt to transact, this first factor,
the nature of the transaction, simply should weigh against fair use.
If the parodist sufficiently shows that she attempted to transact,
but the original author chose not to license, then the court should ex209
amine the reasons for this refusal.
Initially, the parodist must retain

205

As suggested by Professor Merges, the reasonableness of an offer may be as-

sessed by a consensus of licensing experts. See supra text accompanying note 189. Alternatively, the reasonableness of an offer may be determined in light of the damages
that an original author could win in a successful infringement suit against the defendant. The damages section of the CopyrightAct provides:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him
or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright
owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and
the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994). In evaluating the nature of the transaction, the burden of
proving that the offer was consistent with the expected benefits from the use of the
work should rest with the parodist.
206 For a background discussion of the appropriate allocation of the burden of
proof in fair use cases, see Gordon, supra note 24, at 1624-26. Professor Gordon suggests that the defendant should have the initial burden of proving that market failure
exists and will continue even if ajudgment of liability were tendered. See id. at 1625. If
the proof of market failure offered by the defendant leads a court to doubt the presence of injury to the plaintiff, however, "it is legitimate for the court to demand evidence from the copyright owner that such injury would indeed follow ... [because
t]he harm he has suffered or anticipates is an area that should be peculiarly within
plaintiff's knowledge." Id. at 1626.
207 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) ("If
the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted.").
208 For a discussion of how voluntary transactions lead to efficiency,
see supra notes
111-13 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this model, I assume that an ex
ante transaction is preferable to fair use litigation, regardless of the outcome.
209 Evaluating the nature of the transaction addresses the importance of fostering
a
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the burden of showing that her work provides social benefit through
criticism of the original work.
Once the parodist shows some social
benefit and criticism from the use of the author's work, however, the
burden should shift to the original author to explore the reasons behind the refusal to transact2 ' Allocating the burden in this manner
respects the original author's control over the preparation of derivative works by requiring
her to produce evidence only against a recog212
nized parodist.
As explained by Professor Gordon, an author who refuses to
transact merely to avoid ridicule effectively prevents much needed information, namely in the form of critical commentary, from reaching
the market.21 Further, it is suggested that an author may have antidissemination motives not only due to an unwillingness to face ridicule, but also due to potential disagreement with the critical commentary made by the parodist.214 For an author who likely would refuse to
license for such a reason, the nature of the transaction should weigh
in favor of fair use. 2 5 This determination may be aided by the second
factor, the strength of the critical element; that is, the more effective
reasonable market transaction, as stressed by Merges and Gordon in the models above.
See supra text accompanying notes 172-76, 188-89 (describing the significance of considering the nature of the market transaction, as applied in the Merges and Gordon
models). This factor also adopts the reasoning suggested by Professor Winslow regarding the importance of the conduct and relations of the parties and the strength of the
parodic element. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (suggesting that the likelihood of voluntary exchange depends greatly on "the relationship between the parties
and the reasons the original author wants to retain the interest").
210 See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1625 (asserting that
if a parodist's use "serves no
social
211 purpose,...
. ..... further consideration of his fair use claim would be unwarranted").
Requiring the original author to provide evidence minimizes information problems. For an example of constraints that the lack of information may place on an economic analysis of the fair use defense, see Fisher, supra note 107, at 1739. See also supra
notes 159-63 (discussing how works of parody weaken the efficiency argument in favor
of allocating the right of derivative uses to an original author); supra note 206 (discussing Gordon's recognition of the possibility of burden-shifting to the original author if
the defendant provides proof of market failure).
212 See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text (exploring
the most efficient allocation of the right to produce derivative works between the original and derivative

authors).
213 See supratext accompanying notes 175-76 (discussing the anti-dissemination
motives of authors who desire to keep information from the public).
214 See Merges, supra note 107, at 311-12 (discussing the problems
with Posner's
weapon/target distinction).
15Although this effectively may serve as a deterrent to the creation of
original
works, "the free flow of information is at stake." Gordon, supranote 24, at 1633. Because the goal of copyright is to provide incentives for the creation of works that satisfy
consumer tastes, "[i]f a criticism reveals a work's flaws, it is appropriate that demand
for the work should decrease." Id.
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the critical message in the parody, the more likely an illegitimate motive fuels the original author's desire to deny the derivative use. If the
strength of the parodic element is weak, however, the desire of an
original author to maintain control over her work should be respected, and the nature of the transaction should weigh against fair
use.216
An inquiry into the nature of the transaction acts as an incentive
for authors to transact. Most parodists, aware that failing to offer reasonable compensation before using a work weakens the defense of fair
use, likely will attempt to transact with an original author. Most
authors, aware that refusing to transact with parodists for purposes of
withholding criticism from the public will strip them of their rights,
likely will negotiate with parodists ex ante. The first prong, then, may
lead to increases in voluntary transactions, which achieves a movement toward an efficient state.217 The focus on the parties' mutual
willingness to license also injects an element of objectivity into the fair
use analysis that is otherwise lacking.1
b. The Strength of the CriticalElement
This factor requires a determination of the extent to which the
derivative work provides a critical message. The purpose of this factor
is two-fold: to examine the strength of the externalities, 219 and to address the issue of market substitution.220 The inquiry into the strength
of the critical element, however, does not embrace the Campbell distinction between works of parody and satire, or Judge Posner's target/weapon distinction, for two reasons.22 ' First, as many works serve
216 See id. at 1633-34 ("Market failure should be found only
when the defendant can
prove that the copyright owner would refuse to license out of a desire unrelated to the
goals of copyright-notably, a desire to keep certain information from the public.").
217 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (explaining that
many efficient
solutions may be reached by voluntary transactions between parties under perfect
market conditions).
218 See supratext accompanying notes 188-90 (recounting Professor Merges's
theory
that a market transaction focus looks to net profit as opposed to a determination of
whether a work may be characterized as parody or satire).
219 See supra note 160 and accompanying text (defining
externalities).
= See supranote 95 (defining market substitution). This factor is also referenced
by the first factor, the nature of the transaction, to determine the legitimacy of an
original author's motive in denying a derivative use. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing how the strength of the critical element helps determine
the author's motives in refusing to license).
22 See supranotes 82-84 (discussing the Campbell test for a
work to qualify as a parody as distinguished from satire). The Supreme Court recognized that a work that
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dual purposes of attacking both the original and society as a whole,
Recategorizing according to one or the other may be impossible.2
quiring that each court create a bright-line as to the sufficient level of

critical commentary directed towards an original to qualify as a parody
risks inconsistency in decisions.us

Second, a derivative work that

qualifies as a satire may provide higher social value than a parody
since it criticizes far more than just one work.24 Thus, it is not alto-

gether clear that works qualifying as satire necessarily should enjoy
lesser weight in the fair use inquiry.us Rather than relying on categorizations, this factor applies a sliding-scale approach: the greater the
critical message, the more the derivative work deserves fair use protection.
Weighing the strength of the critical message incorporates Camp6
bels evaluation of the "transformative" value of a derivative work;2
that is, the more a derivative work provides "new information, new
loosely targets an original still may be sufficiently aimed at the original to qualify as a
parody. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 n.14 (1994). Because a work may contain "both parodic and non-parodic elements," the Court broadly
required that a parody reasonably "be perceived as commenting on the original or
criticizing it, to some degree." Id. at 581, 583. However, in a concurring opinion,Justice Kennedy opted for a narrower test, stating that "It]he parody must target the
original, and not just its general style." Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (describingJudge Posner's target/weapon
distinction).
M See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 (discussing the difficulty in drawing a distincti..n
between a parody and a satire, especially when elements of both exist); Merges, supra
note 107, at 311 (noting that "a successful parody might often be expected to parody
both a copyrighted work and the values it represents").
= See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997), as a narrow construction of the Campbell decision).
24 See Merges, supra note 107, at 311-12 (stating that the
"weapon" cases "serve the
goal of promoting criticism of and commentary on 'larger' social issues and values").
In Campbell, the Supreme Court recognized that, in the right circumstances, fair
use protection may extend to works of satire. The Court stated:
[W]hen there is little or no risk of market substitution, whether because of
the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the new work's minimal
distribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in
the analysis, and the looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as
may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be
required.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 n.14; see also Gregory K. Jung, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 13 BERTEL
CY-.LJ. 119, 132 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he "market failure theory applies just as well to satires as parodies").
26 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the
transformative nature of copyrighted works in providing social benefit); supra notes
159-63 and accompanying text (discussing the positive externality of public benefit).
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aesthetics, new insights and understandings" in the form of criticism,
the more valuable it is to society.2 27 Economically, a copyright owner is
unlikely to internalize the positive externalities that arise from the
creation and dissemination of a derivative work and, as a result, may
refuse to transact even in a situation where the aggregate social benefit increases. 8 Thus, to achieve efficiency, the transformative value
provided by the critical message must be considered in determining
the desirability of reallocation.
The critical impact of the work also increases with the fame of the
ridiculed work. Although parodies "almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works,"m the increase in public benefit associated
with the chosen target of the criticism should not be overlooked. A
work created solely for private commercial gain, however, may not
serve the public as well as a work created primarily to provide a critical
message.230 Yet, because activities of comment and criticism "are generally conducted for profit in this country,"23 1 this consideration
should be given minimal weight in the inquiry.232
Finally, the strength of the critical element addresses the extent to
which the work serves as a market substitute for the original.23 As a
Leval, supranote 1, at 1111.
The movement is towards a Kaldor-Hicks efficient state, rather than a Pareto
efficient state. See supra note 109 (defining Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). That is, it does not argue that reallocation necessarily will make the copyright
owner better off.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
Section 107 directs a court to consider whether the character of the use is of a
commercial nature or is for a nonprofit educational purpose. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)
(1994); see also, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (considering
whether the use "was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain").
231 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting)).
2S2 For a discussion of pre-Campbell reactions to a commercial motive
within the
lower courts, see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. The Court in Campbell determined that a commercial use is not presumptively unfair and should be limited to
one factor in the fair use inquiry. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 ("[C]ommercial or
nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry
into its purpose and character.").
The factor, however, should avoid the requirement addressed in Campbell, that
a
parodist demonstrate an absence of harm to nonparodic derivatives in markets related
to that of the parody. See Campbel, 510 U.S. at 593 ("Evidence of substantial harm to
[the derivative market] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing
of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals."). I
agree with Professor Winslow, who points out that it asks too much of parodists to
demonstrate an absence of harm to works within markets that do not even compete
with the original. See Winslow, supra note 55, at 823 ("It is illogical ... to include critical derivative works, when an author probably will not license, in the same market as
2n
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work increases in critical purpose, the work becomes more likely to
serve a different audience. As a result, a heavily critical parody likely
will not compete with, or act as a substitute in, the market for the
original.2
Therefore, to address sufficiently the strength of the externalities and the issue of market substitution, an increase in the
critical element must weigh in favor of fair use.
c. The Amount of Creative Contributions
Finally, an increase in the amount of contribution by the parodist
should weigh in favor of finding fair use. The purpose of this prong is
to minimize the free-rider problem2 5 and to assess whether the paro2 6
dist deserves the allocation of the right to prepare a derivative work.
Evaluating the parodist's contributions minimizes the free-rider problem by ensuring that the parodist does not use the original author's
creativity at no cost. A mere devotion of extensive resources to the
parody, however, should not alone favor a finding of fair use.
Rather, only those creative elements added by the parodist should determine whether the contributions sufficiently overcome the free-rider
problem.2s In addition, the greater the parodist's own creative contributions, the greater the value society places on that work. Thus, an

noncritical derivative works, which the author may license."); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a defendant is not required to demonstrate an absence of market harm to a derivative market
where the plaintiff cannot identify any derivative market that may be harmed).
The Court in Campbell recognized that "the parody and the original usually
serve different market functions." 510 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted).
235 See supratext accompanying notes 117-22 (discussing the
free-rider problem).
M See supratext accompanying notes 152-66 (discussing why arguments in favor
of
granting an original author control over the derivative uses of her work may be
strained for works of parody). This factor addresses the substantiality of the taking in
traditional fair use analysis. See ampbell, 510 U.S. at 587-88 ("[A] work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely
to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original."). This prong also
parallels the third factor of Professor Winslow's model. See Winslow, supra note 55, at
811-12 (recommending a requirement that the parodist make substantial adaptations
or contributions to the original work).
237 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(finding that the "primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but 'to promote the "Progress of Science and useful Arts"'" (citation omitted)); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 586 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("To extend
copyrightability to miniscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in
the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public
domain work.").
See supra notes 26-30 (discussing the differences required between an original
work and derivative works to make the derivative work copyrightable).
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increase in the substantiality of the contributions by the parodist
weighs in favor of fair use.
3. Limitations
Certainly, the proposed model is not without limitations. The
most obvious drawback is that the model requires the case-by-case application of a number of factors. Despite the model's avoidance of a
threshold characterization, and the addition of an element of objectivity (through the first factor), the weight given to each factor requires
subjective assessments. Additionally, because the model contains few,
if any, measurable variables, the value given to each factor likely will
differ among factfinders2s Any such weighing and balancing of subjectively valued elements may lead to inconsistent results. The application of the proposed model to the Leibovitz decision exposes these
limitations.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL TO
LEIBOVZ V. PARAMOUNTPICTURFS
A. The Second Circuit'sDecision
In Leibovitz, the Second Circuit faced the question of whether the
District Court erred in holding that the use of a parody of Leibovitz's
photograph by Paramount was fair.2 '0 Leibovitz contended that even
if the advertisement appropriately was considered a parody of her
photograph, Paramount used it for commercial purposes and replicated more of her work than necessary.24 The Second Circuit started
its analysis with a brief history of the fair use defense and a discussion
239 Professor Lloyd Weinreb noted this problem
in a recent commentary on fair
use where he disagreed with the economic approaches of Professors Fisher and
Gordon in that "fair use depends on a calculus of incommensurables." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use Lecture (Nov. 12, 1988), in 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1999).
Weinreb argued that although some elements of the fair use test give the "comforting
appearance of being measurable ... the appearance is empty." Id at 1307.
240 See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110
(2d Cir. 1998).
The district court found that "[t]hree of the four fair use factors in the present case
militate in favor of a finding of fair use, largely because the defendant's transformation
of the plaintiff's photograph has resulted in public access to two distinct works." Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Furthermore, Leibovitz herself stated in her deposition that she thought the Nielsen picture was a parody of her own work, and the court subsequently found that the Nielsen
photograph was a parody rather than a satire. See id. at 1222-23.
241 See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 112.

UNlVERSITY OFPEVNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

926

[Vol. 148:889

of the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell. 42 In doing so, it clarified
both the general fair use defense and the fair use defense for parodies.2 4 The court then applied the four factors of section 107 to
Paramount's advertisement.2 44
Considering the purpose of the use, the court first questioned
whether "Paramount's advertisement 'may reasonably be perceived' . .. as a new work that 'at least in part, comments on' Leibovitz's photograph."2 45 The court quickly decided that Paramount's additions to the original were sufficient to create a "transformative
work."246 After briefly noting the closeness of the inquiry, the court
also found that the advertisement adequately commented on the seriousness and pretentiousness of the original, thereby achieving the
level of ridicule contemplated by Campbell 247 Furthermore, the court
noted that the advertisement might reasonably be perceived to comment on the Leibovitz photograph by "extol[ling] the beauty of the
pregnant female body, and, rather unchivalrously... disagree[ing]
with this message."2 4' Thus, the court found a parodic purpose for the
defendant's advertisement.
In addressing the commercial purpose of the advertisement, the
court opined that, although the advertising use lessened the "indulgence" to which the ad was entitled, "'[I] ess indulgence' ... does not
mean no indulgence at all." 249 The court found that "the strong parodic nature
of the ad tip[ped] the first factor significantly toward fair
250
use.
Under the guidance of Campbell, the court determined that the
242 See id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994)).
243 See id. at 112-15; supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's application of the fair use defense in Campbell).
244

See id. at 114.

245 Id. (quoting Campbell 510 U.S. at 580, 582).
2I.
The court noted "some concern about the ease with which every parodist

could win" by pointing out the differences between their works and the original. Id.
The court then stated that "[b]eing different from an original does not inevitably
.comment' on the original." Id.
247 See id. (finding that "[b]ecause the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts

so strikingly with the serious expression on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived as commenting on ... the original").
248 Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
249 Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585). The court also considered whether
the
jocular nature of the film advertised could be extended to a consideration of the advertisement itself and found that "the parodic comment of the ad might reasonably be
perceived as reenforced [sic] by the kidding comments of the movie concerning pregnang and parenthood." Id.

Id
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second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, slightly favored
Leibovitz2 ' The court nonetheless diligently followed the Supreme
Court's instruction, stating that "the creative nature of an original
normally will not provide much
help in determining whether a parody
2
of the original is fair use. "

In considering the third factor, the substantiality of the portion
used by Paramount, the court observed that Paramount went to "great
lengths" to copy the protectable aspects of the original.2 3 The protectable artistic elements that Paramount copied included the particular lighting, camera angle selection, and resulting skin tone of the subject.2" As a result, the court found that Paramount took more of
Leibovitz's photograph than minimally necessary to conjure up the
original.25 The court refused, however, to allow the third factor to tip
the scale in favor of Leibovitz, reasoning that the "approach [in Campbell] leaves the third factor with little, if any, weight against
fair use so
"
long as the first and fourth factors favor the parodist. 25
Finally, as to the fourth factor, the court found that Paramount's
photograph "did not interfere with any potential market for [Leibovitz's] photograph or for derivative works based upon it."5 7 Leibovitz
repeatedly stated in a deposition, however, that the parody would have
a negative effect on her relationship with other celebrities whom she
photographs, as a result of their fear of future ridicule or embarrassment.m In response, the court noted that the "possibility of criticism
or comment-whether or not parodic-is a risk artists and their subjects must accept."5 9 Thus, the court concluded that the aggregate

See id. (stating that Paramount conceded the point that Leibovitz's photograph
exhibited creative expression).
252 Id.; see also supranotes 87-88 and accompanying text (summarizing the Campbell
251

decision concerning the second factor).
SId. at 116.
See id. ("Elements of originality in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and
almost any other variant involved." (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d

Cir. 1992))).
25 See i. (explaining that Paramount copied the protectable aspects
of Leibovitz's
photograph to an "extreme degree"). The court also noted that Paramount used
computer enhancements to ensure an almost identical skin color as on the subject of
the original. See iU.
258 Id1
257
I& at
28Seeid.
116 n.7.
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assessment of the factors strongly favored the defendant and affirmed
2 6°
the District Court's ruling of summary judgment for Paramount
B. Applying the Economic Model to the Factsof Leibovitz
Application of the proposed model to the facts of Leibovitz leads to
a different result than that reached by the Second Circuit. The first
factor, the nature of the transaction, weighs squarely against fair use
because Paramount never attempted to transact with Leibovitz.261 The
purpose of the first prong is to promote voluntary transactions, and
Paramount would fail the initial burden of proving an attempted
transaction. 262
Next, the model requires an evaluation of the strength of the
critical element. The public benefit from Paramount's work weighs in
favor of fair use. Certainly, as the Second Circuit found, the work is
transformative, 26 because the advertisement reasonably provides a
number of critiques of the underlying work.2 4 The external benefit
also is enhanced by the popularity of the Leibovitz work and the reach
of the Paramount advertisement. Moreover, the critical element suggests minimal harm to the market for the original since Paramount's
work is likely to cater to a different audience. The commercial purpose of the work, however, dilutes the weight given to this factor. The
work was not created for the sale of parody for its own sake, but rather
for the purpose of promoting a commercial product.2
Finally, the third factor, the adaptations made by Paramount,

See id. at 117 (finding that the aggregate assessment might be more difficult in a
case where the factors weighed "heavily on opposite sides of the balance").
26 See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F.
Supp. 1214, 1216 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding that Paramount never attempted negotiations with Leibovitz).
262 Assuming Paramount attempted to transact and demonstrated
some level of
criticism of Leibovitz's work, Paramount's argument as to the nature of the transaction
would be strong. The record suggests that Leibovitz likely would have refused to license the work for fear that future celebrities would avoid her services for fear of being
parodied. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (explaining that Leibovitz believed the parody would hurt her relationships with celebrities who feared future embarrassment if photographed by her). Additionally, Paramount's ad presented critical
elements, which further suggests that Leibovitz would have refused to transact for antidissemination purposes.
263 See Leibovit, 137 F.3d at 114 ("Plainly, the ad adds something new
and qualifies
as a 'transformative' work.").
26 See id. at 114-15 (describing the number of possible critiques conveyed
by the
image of Leslie Nielsen's head on the pregnant body of Demi Moore).
See id. at 115 (explaining that "[t]he ad was created and displayed to promote
a
commercial product, the film").
2W
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weighs heavily against fair use. The minimal creative contributions
made by Paramount are insufficient to overcome the free-rider problem. Although Paramount devoted extensive resources to ensure
similarity between the works, Paramount acquired most of the creative
elements from Leibovitz free of cost.2 6 In addition, the minimal con-

tributions do not support a claim by Paramount for an allocation of
the derivative use. Therefore, the third factor weighs against a finding
of fair use.
On balance, the final assessment under the proposed model is difficult given the strength of the factors on both sides. The proposed
model, however, supports a finding against fair use. In comparing my
conclusion with that of the Second Circuit, the former emphasizes an
optimal economic outcome whereas the latter follows the judicial
precedent of CampbelL Although the Second Circuit's outcome was
legally appropriate, it falls short when economic considerations are
taken fully into account. Considering the three factors of the proposed economic model, the Second Circuit adequately addressed only
the strength of the critical element. The Second Circuit did not address Paramount's failure to attempt a transaction and it appears that
the court trivialized the free-rider problem. By relying too heavily
upon the overriding parodic purpose and the minimal market harm
to the original, the court failed to accord sufficient weight to the
minimalness of Paramount's contributions and the extensiveness of its
copying.
CONCLUSION
The fair use defense provides flexibility to ensure that its dual
aims-to provide incentive for authors to produce creative works and
to promote the adequate dissemination of such works-are met.
Courts have struggled with the fair use defense for centuries, especially when dealing with works of parody. Uncertainty exists even after
the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., in

which the Court attempted to clarify the fair use defense for works of
parody. In that case, the Court directed lower courts to make a variety
of subjective evaluations, including whether a work qualifies as a parody or a satire. As scholars have recognized, economics should guide
courts in analyzing the fair use defense in parody cases because every
See id at 116 (finding that Leibovitz's protectable creativity extends to "such artistic elements as the particular lighting, the resulting skin tone of the subject, and the
26

camera angle").
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fair use analysis requires an exploration into the fundamental tenets
of copyright law which, in turn, are based on economic principles.
Based on the economic principles of copyright law and a survey of
economic models created by scholars, I propose a model to apply to
fair use cases addressing works of parody. The factors of the model
are: (1) the nature of the transaction, (2) the strength of the critical
element, and (3) the amount of creative contributions. This model
provides a method of evaluation that addresses economic concerns
while maintaining a practical, case-by-case inquiry. The model avoids
the determination discussed in Campbell of whether a work qualifies as
a parody or a satire, since courts may overemphasize the distinction.
The model is limited, however, by requiring subjective assessments regarding the weight given to each factor.
Application of the proposed economic model to the Second Circuit's decision in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., in which the
court decided that the use of a copyrighted photograph of pregnant
actress Demi Moore constituted fair use, reveals that the Second Circuit adequately addressed the strength of the critical message. The
proposed model requires a more extensive exploration, however, into
the reasons for the failure of the transaction. In addition, Leibovitz's
interest in protecting against free-riders should have been given more
weight. I conclude that the economic model favors a finding against
fair use.

